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Abstract – We present a broad agenda for meaningful banking regulation reform 
aiming the creation of evolutive competitive environment to maximize the 
effectiveness of international financial system through the introduction of fair 
competition process among the banks in free market capitalism. We assume that the 
international financial system may evolve or decline within the evolutive competitive 
environment depending on both the environmental regulation policies as well as the 
competition between the banks. We present the commonly known definition of 
competition and apply the conceptual collateral thinking to identify the source of 
competitive strengths of financial institutions in free market capitalism. We explore 
how the banks conduct a search for competitive strategies. We show that the root cause 
of crisis in finances is hidden in the very wrong regulation policies and ideas behind 
these policies, which failed to create the evolutive competitive environment for 
effective, profitable, responsible and sustainable bank operation within existing 
international financial system. We review a number of initiatives on meaningful 
banking regulation reform proposed by central bankers from the G20 nations. We 
propose to introduce the Random Tax and the Quantum Tax. We argue that the 
introduction of the Random Tax and the Quantum Tax may compensate for the 
negative effects commonly associated with the existing banking regulation limitations 
imposed on the international financial system. We believe that the Random Tax and the 
Quantum Tax will improve the evolutive competitive environment and make it possible 
for the management teams at financial institutions to search for and to execute the 
winning virtuous business strategies toward the effective, profitable, responsible and 
sustainable banks operation. 
 
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb 
 The British multinational banking was created in the course of evolutionary 
processes in finances over 18, 19, and 20 centuries in Jones G G (1993). The 
competition among banks was a main driving force behind the evolution of British 
multinational banking. The powerful forces of competition shaped the competitive 
landscape in banking at national and global scales creating the traditional architecture 
of international financial system in Samuelson, Barnett (2007). 
So, let us provide a definition of competition from The American Heritage 
Dictionary (1985): 
1. Competition is the act of competing for a profit or a prize; 
2. Competition is the rivalry between two or more businesses striving for the 
same customer or market. 
Considering the modern international financial system, one question may arise 
in analogy with research approach in Chandler (2005): What is the base for the 
competitive strengths of financial institutions in free market capitalism? 
In free market economies, the competitive strengths of financial institutions and 
investment firms rest on learned organizational capabilities in Chandler (2005). The 
process of organizational learning in financial institutions begins with the building of 
profit making commercial or investment bank, which is accomplished through the 
creation of organizational capabilities based on three types of knowledge in Chandler 
(2005): 
1. Technical capabilities (knowledge of advanced technologies to create new 
financial products or services) 
2. Functional capabilities (development, marketing and distribution); 
3. Managerial capabilities (management knowledge and experience). 
Evolving paths of learning in the financial industry are similar to other 
industries. They include the three stages in Chandler (2005): 
1. Building Barriers to Entry; 
2. Defining Strategic Boundaries of the competing banks within the financial 
industry competitive arena; 
3. Encountering Limits to Growth. 
The main problem to understand is: How do the commercial and investment 
banks create the barriers to entry and define the strategic boundaries to compete with 
other banks? The answer is that they do so by adopting a corporate strategy in 
Chandler (2005). 
Focusing on the bank’s strategy, we have to start with the two questions 
formulated in Gavetti, Rivkin (2007): 
1. Where does a bank’s competitive strategy come from? 
2. How do the initial conditions, foresight, experience, competitive feedback, 
and other forces combine to shape the origins of competitive strategies? 
Let us define the strategy: The strategy is a management team’s way of seeing 
its place in its environment as well as the firm’s way of interacting with the 
environment in Gavetti G, Rivkin J W (2007). Creation of strategy is cognitive time 
dependant process in Johnson, Scholes, Whittington (2007); Johnson, Langley, Melin, 
Whittington (2007); Johnson, Scholes, Ambrosini (1998); Johnson, Hendry, Balogun 
(1993). Usually, the management team conducts the strategy search using the 
positioning model in Porter (1980, 1985, 1996, 2008); Ghemawat (1991); 
Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) and the evolutionary model in Nelson, Winter (1982); 
Winter (1987, 2000). Coupling of the inductive logic in Wikipedia (2009), deductive 
logic in (Wikipedia) and abductive logic in  Peirce (1958); Wikipedia (2009) is 
effectively applied in the positioning model and evolutionary model with the purpose 
of competitive strategy search by management team in organization in process of 
competition among banks in evolutive competitive environment in free market 
capitalism in Gavetti G, Rivkin J W (2007); Collis, Montgomery, Goold, Campbell, 
Prahalad, Lieberthal, Hart (1999). 
Let us provide the definitions for the different logics employed in strategy 
search process: 
Inductive logic — the logic of what is operative — reasons from the specific to 
the general in Martin (2008, 2009). Induction allows inferring a entails b from multiple 
instantiations of a and b at the same time in Wikipedia (2009). 
Deductive logic — the logic of what must be — reasons from the general to the 
specific in Martin (2008, 2009). Deduction allows deriving b as a consequence of a. In 
other words, deduction is the process of deriving the consequences of what is assumed 
in Wikipedia (2009). 
Abductive logic –the logic of what could possibly be true –reasons through 
successive approximation in Martin (2008, 2009). Abduction allows inferring a as an 
explanation of b, because of this, abduction allows the precondition a to be inferred 
from the consequence b in Wikipedia (2009). 
Let us make the definition of the competitive strategy execution / 
implementation: The execution of competitive strategy from the organizational 
perspective is a chain of changes management by management team in a bank, which 
competes with other financial institutions in evolutive competitive environment in free 
market capitalism. 
Now, we have completed our short review on: 
1. Origin of competitive strategy; 
2. Methods of search for competitive strategy; and learned about 
3. True meaning of strategy execution definition. 
Therefore, we can make an important conclusion that the evolutive competitive 
environment has a direct impact on the ability of management team at bank to 
conduct the strategy search and make a choice for the best competitive strategy 
toward the effective, profitable, responsible and sustainable bank operation. In 
our opinion, most of the resources to create a basis for effective corporate strategy 
to gain competitive advantage over competing banks, are mainly derived by 
bank’s management team from the evolutive competitive environment. 
 
Next practical question is: Can the banks be profitable by pursuing the best 
competitive strategies in conditions, when the evolutive competitive environment starts 
to degrade, because of imperfect regulation? The answer is “No.” The existing banking 
regulation creates the evolutive competitive environment with its own limitations, and 
in turn, impacts the full process of strategy search and execution by management teams 
in financial institutions. Therefore, we can conclude that the root cause of crisis in 
finances is hidden in the very wrong regulation policies and ideas behind these 
policies, which failed to create the evolutive competitive environment for effective, 
profitable, responsible and sustainable bank operation within existing 
international financial system, but not the inability of management teams of banks 
to find the competitive strategies. 
 
Let us think about the next question: How will the global financial crisis change 
the competition among the financial institutions? 
We have to acknowledge the fact that the competitive landscape in banking was 
already changed completely as a result of crisis. Some big investment firms were 
bankrupt in the USA, the UK and elsewhere. Many banks turned for financial support 
from the central banks, which are the lenders of last resource. 
We think that it is necessary to break up the big inefficient banks, because the 
small and medium size banks tend to be more efficient in serving the needs of small 
and medium size businesses. The small bank management teams do enormously benefit 
from flexible managerial structure during the decision making process and can react on 
constantly changing local market conditions promptly. In addition, the capital 
accumulation, supply and distribution chains are more optimized for purposes of 
commercial and investment banking in small banks. Therefore, we firmly believe that 
small and medium size banks will dominate and define the competitive landscape in 
banking in era of great changes by globalization. 
 
Let us focus on the key problem: How will the proposed regulatory changes 
affect competition between banks and between banks and other institutions? 
Fist of all, in our opinion, the meaningful banking regulation reform has to 
create a new evolutive competitive environment to maximize the effectiveness of 
international financial system through the introduction of fair competition process 
between the banks in evolutive competitive environment in free market capitalism. 
Speaking figuratively, we think that the management teams at banks could indeed be 
able to adapt and implement the virtuous competitive business strategies, if the 
genuinely evolutive high competitive environment for banks operation within 
international financial system would be created in first place. 
 
The key issue is: How can the goal of creation of new regulation for evolutive 
competitive environment be achieved in conditions of globalization? 
Let us take a look on the history of dealing with similar financial and economic 
downturns in the USA in the periods of great depression and recessions in last century. 
The Roosevelt administration engineered sweeping federal intervention into the 
marketplace in time of financial crisis, including in Thompson (2009): 
1. Creation of federal deposit insurance; 
2. Securities regulation; 
3. Banking supervision; and 
4. Separation of commercial and investment banking under the Glass-Steagall 
Act. 
Let us review a number of initiatives on meaningful banking regulation reform 
proposed by central bankers from G20 nations at present time. 
Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal 
Reserve System proposes a broad-based agenda for reform, which should include at 
least five key elements in Bernanke (2009): 
1. Consolidated supervision of systemically important financial institutions: 
Legislative change is needed to ensure that systemically important financial firms are 
subject to effective consolidated supervision, whether or not the firm owns a bank;  
2. Systemic risk oversight: Oversight council made up of the agencies involved 
in financial supervision and regulation should be established, with a mandate to 
monitor and identify emerging risks to financial stability across the entire financial 
system, to identify regulatory gaps, and to coordinate the agencies' responses to 
potential systemic risks. To further encourage a more comprehensive and holistic 
approach to financial oversight, all federal financial supervisors and regulators – not 
just the Federal Reserve – should be directed and empowered to take account of risks to 
the broader financial system as part of their normal oversight responsibilities;  
3. Improved resolution process: New special resolution process should be 
created that would allow the government to wind down a failing systemically important 
financial institution whose disorderly collapse would pose substantial risks to the 
financial system and the broader economy. Importantly, this regime should allow the 
government to impose losses on shareholders and creditors of the firm; 
4. Payment, clearing, and settlement arrangements: All systemically important 
payment, clearing, and settlement arrangements should be subject to consistent and 
robust oversight and prudential standards;   
5. Consumer protection: Policymakers should ensure that consumers are 
protected from unfair and deceptive practices in their financial dealings. 
Also, Ben S Bernanke notes that the assets on the Federal Reserve's balance 
sheet have changed, because of financial crisis, and can be usefully grouped into four 
new categories in Bernanke (2009): 
1. Short-term lending programs that provide backstop liquidity to financial 
institutions such as banks, broker-dealers, and money market mutual funds; 
2. Targeted lending programs, which include loans to nonfinancial borrowers 
and are intended to address dysfunctions in key credit markets; 
3. Holdings of marketable securities, including Treasury notes and bonds, the 
debt of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) (agency debt), and agency-
guaranteed mortgage-backed securities (MBS); and 
4. Emergency lending intended to avert the disorderly collapse of systemically 
critical financial institutions. I will say a bit more about each of these in turn. 
 
Mario Draghi, Governor of the Bank of Italy and Chairman of the Financial 
Stability Board states in Draghi (2009): "Countries have responded to the severity of 
the crisis with discretionary policies to sustain the economy. Two main objectives for 
economic policy are: 
1. Ensuring the resumption of progress towards consolidating the public 
finances, in order to converge towards budgetary balance; and 
2. Sustaining productivity and economic growth. 
Also, Mario Draghi stresses that the response to the crisis has consisted 
primarily in three decree laws, which together appropriated €25 billion of resources for 
the three years 2009-11 in Draghi (2009): 
1. First package introduced transfer payments to low-income households 
(known as the family bonus, which supplemented the social card scheme launched 
during the previous summer); automatic income stabilizers were strengthened for the 
two years 2009-10 (a measure funded with national and EU funds on the basis of a 
State-Regions agreement); there were increases in the allocations for investment in 
public works and in investment grants to the State Railways group (in part to offset 
previous cutbacks), in conjunction with the adoption of new procedures to speed up the 
realization of projects included within the National Strategic Reference Framework.  
2. Second measure issued last February dealt mainly with incentives for the 
purchase of cars; 
3. Third decree law introduced tax incentives for investment in machinery 
between July 2009 and June 2010, through the exclusion from firms’ income of half the 
expenditure. 
The structural reforms are needed to render the measures efficacy: 
1. Reform of the budget cycle may improve the control of expenditure; 
2. Fiscal federalism must contribute to curbing expenditure;   
3. Significant increase in the average effective retirement age is desirable;  
4. Reduce tax evasion; 
5. Reforms for reviving growth; 
6. Increase the efficiency of government departments; 
7. Improve the quality and effectiveness of government action; 
8. Modernize schools and universities; 
9. Eliminate the fragmentation of worker protection." 
 
Axel A Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank expresses his opinion in 
Weber (2009): 
The financial crisis has demonstrated that banks remain the primary link 
between the financial system and the real economy. 
While it is true that regulation and oversight have to be extended to all 
systemically important financial institutions, better regulation of banks is therefore an 
even more important building block in a stable financial system. For this reason, it is 
essential to further improve banks’ risk management and to review their capital and 
liquidity requirements. 
 
Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway) makes his 
point on the issues in Gjedrem (2009):  
1. Higher capital adequacy requirement and new minimum equity capital ratio 
requirement: Banks are required to hold capital in proportion to their risk-taking, the 
so-called minimum Tier 1 capital requirement. Tier 1 capital is composed of equity 
capital and other capital that can be used to absorb losses on a going-concern basis; 
2. Strengthen quality of Tier 1 capital: Under the current rules, up to 50 per cent 
of a bank’s Tier 1 capital can consist of hybrid instruments, which are a combination of 
debt and equity. The remainder must comprise common equity only. Perpetual capital 
securities and other hybrid instruments cannot be used as easily as equity capital to 
absorb losses on a going concern or at liquidation. The possibility of limiting Tier 1 
capital to common equity is now being considered; 
3. Build up buffers in good times that can be drawn on in periods of stress: 
Reducing the procyclicality of bank behaviour is vital. Risk weights calculated on short 
series that do not include downturns are thus of little value. Banks have to provision for 
potential losses through the cycle; 
4. Regulation of systemically important banks more stringent than for other 
banks: This can be achieved by introducing overall higher capital requirements or 
seeking to restrict growth in these institutions by imposing stricter requirements than 
for other banks; 
5. Increased and improved liquidity: The financial crisis showed that many 
assets held by banks for liquidity purposes were not particularly liquid. More capital is 
important for the solidity of the banking sector. The Basel rules require capital for 
banks’ assets, but do not stipulate how the assets are to be financed or their liquidity. It 
is now being considered whether common requirements should be introduced as to the 
amount of liquid assets a bank must hold to survive a stress situation over a period of 
for example 30 days without drawing on loans in the central bank. In addition, there 
will be funding stability requirements. The Basel Committee is expected to make 
concrete proposals in the course of the year. 
 
Glenn Stevens, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia discusses the 
perspectives on the financial regulation in Stevens (2009): I suggest that we need to do 
two things. 
1. First, we need to draw the right lessons from our experience of the past 
couple of years. There are no doubt many lessons that might be mentioned. I will list 
just a few that I think are important: 
1) First lesson is that the business cycle still exists and that financial behaviour 
matters, sometimes a lot, to how that cycle unfolds. We need to have a broad definition 
of the term “business cycle” in mind. There is more than just the cycle in the “real” 
economy of GDP, employment, consumer price inflation and so on. These remain 
important, but it is just as important to recognize the cycles in risk-taking behaviour 
and finance. Failing to do that is precisely what has got some countries into trouble this 
time; 
2) Second lesson we ought to draw from recent experience is that while 
downturns will inevitably occur, we are not helpless to do anything about their severity; 
3) Next lesson: when downturns come, we can recover; 
4) Long-term investments in prudent fiscal and monetary frameworks paid off. 
2. Second, we need to apply those lessons in the right way to the challenges that 
are likely to confront us over the years ahead: 
1) First, we start this upswing with less spare capacity than some previous ones. 
After a big recession, it usually takes some years for well-above-trend growth in 
demand to use up the spare capacity created by the recession. This time that process 
will not take as long. Most measures of capacity utilization, unemployment and 
underemployment are much more like what we saw after the slowdown in 2001, than 
what we saw after the recession in the early 1990s; 
2) Second, and following on the theme of potential supply, others have noted 
that the rate of population growth at present is the highest since the 1960s. On one 
hand, this may help alleviate capacity constraints, insofar as certain types of labor are 
concerned. On the other hand, immigrants need to house themselves and need access to 
various goods and services as well. That is, they add to demand as well as to supply; 
3) Third, the likely build-up in resources sector investment over the years ahead 
carries significant implications for the medium-term performance and structure of the 
economy; 
4) Australia has many advantages. The financial sector remains in pretty good 
shape. The Government does not own, and has not had to give direct support to, any 
financial institution. Australia, therefore, will be relatively free of the difficult 
governance and exit strategy challenges that such support is raising in some countries. 
Public finances remain in good shape, with a medium-term path for the budget back 
towards balance, and without the large debt burdens that will inevitably narrow the 
options available to governments in other countries. We remain open for trade and 
investment, with an exposure to Asia, which still has the most dynamic growth 
potential in the world over the next several decades. 
 
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada makes his thoughtful remarks 
on the problem in Carney (2009): There are two main approaches to reform: 
1. First, protect the banks from the economic cycle; in other words, make each 
bank, individually, more resilient: 
i. Raise the quality, consistency, and transparency of the Tier 1 capital base. 
Going forward, the predominant form of Tier 1 capital must consist of common shares 
and retained earnings. Moreover, deductions and prudential filters (such as goodwill 
and other intangibles, investments in own shares, deferred tax assets, etc.) will be 
harmonized internationally and generally applied at the level of common equity. 
Finally, all components of the capital base will be fully disclosed. 
ii. Introduce a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure of capital adequacy to 
the Basel II risk-based framework. To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage 
ratio will be harmonized internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting 
(such as netting). 
iii. Introduce a framework for countercyclical capital buffers above the 
minimum requirement. The Bank of Canada is working closely with OSFI and our 
international counterparts on proposed elements of this framework. 
iv. Create a minimum global standard for funding liquidity that includes 
requirement for a stressed liquidity-coverage ratio, underpinned by a longer-term 
structural liquidity ratio. As in other areas, standard setters will need to take a 
comprehensive approach. 
Central banks have real concerns about ratchet effects (large buffers are built 
beyond the standard), particularly in light of the inherent procyclicality of liquidity 
(i.e., institutions want more liquidity in bad times so "buffers" cannot be drawn upon). 
One potential mitigant would be to ensure that there is a broad range of 
securities that are liquid in all states of the world. That is tougher than it sounds as 
anyone who tried to repo quasi-sovereigns throughout the last year knows. I will 
address some potential solutions to this problem momentarily. The Bank strongly 
believes that the standard should not bind in times of systemic crises. 
2. Second, protect the cycle from the banks; that is, make the system as a whole 
more resilient: 
i. As is the case in Canada, all regulators should institute staged intervention 
regimes to detect problems early. 
ii. Banks themselves should develop "living wills," or plans to unwind in an 
orderly fashion if they were to fail. If this process results in simpler organizations, so 
be it. At a minimum, the exercise will underscore the shared responsibility for financial 
stability and improve regulators’ understanding of firms’ business models. 
iii. The Basel oversight committee agreed to "reduce the systemic risk 
associated with the resolution of cross-border banks." Closing down a multinational 
institution is a horrifically difficult challenge, but without progress in this area, the 
efficiency of the global system will likely decline, perhaps significantly. For example, 
viable cross-border resolution is the key to ensure that a financial institution’s liquidity 
continues to be optimally distributed across its international operations. 
iv. Finally, the Bank of Canada believes that continuously open markets are 
essential for a system to be robust to failure. The crisis was clearly exacerbated by the 
seizure of interbank and repo markets. Good collateral became un-financeable 
overnight, firms failed, risk aversion skyrocketed, and the global economy plummeted. 
 
Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank elaborates on monetary 
policy and financial stability in Ingves (2009): 
1. Monetary policy and the economic situation: the policy we are currently 
conducting is what we consider to be necessary to attain the inflation target and to 
provide sufficient support for the recovery in the Swedish economy. We cannot adapt 
monetary policy on the basis of individual markets as long as we do not regard this as 
something that affects our ability to meet the inflation target and to safeguard financial 
stability; 
2. “Extraordinary” or “unconventional” measures to attain the inflation target 
and to safeguard financial stability: Governments, central banks and other authorities 
around the world have taken extensive measures to recreate confidence in the financial 
markets, to maintain financial stability and to counteract the negative effects of the 
crisis on economic activity. The central banks’ measures, such as lending to the banks, 
are reflected in the fact that their balance sheets have increased substantially during the 
crisis: 
1) To attain the inflation target, it has been necessary to make use of new tools 
to get the financial markets functioning better, to increase the access to loans and to try 
to bring down various interest rates and risk premiums that have counteracted monetary 
policy. One example is that we have clearly communicated that we assume that the 
repo rate will remain at 0.25 per cent for a fairly long period of time. In our most recent 
forecast the repo rate remains around this level until autumn 2010. Another measure is 
that the Riksbank lends money to the banks at longer maturities than normal. The 
purpose is to contribute to continued lower interest rates on loans to companies and 
households; 
2) The measures implemented to safeguard financial stability have similar 
effects, but the fundamental aim is different. The intention has mainly been to make it 
easier for the Swedish banks to manage their short-term and medium-term funding. 
Particularly during the most intense phase of the crisis it was difficult for the banks to 
borrow other than at very short maturities. It may also be necessary to help financial 
markets that have suffered serious disruptions to function more smoothly. One can say 
that the Riksbank has functioned as an intermediary in the bank system – a function 
that the market does not normally require. One BIS Review 138/2009  7  example in 
this area, too, is the loans offered to the banks at longer maturities, in both Swedish 
kronor and US dollars. Another example is that the Riksbank has entered into what are 
known as swap agreements with the Fed and the ECB, which means that if necessary 
we can borrow dollars or euro in exchange for Swedish kronor. A further measure is 
that we accept more types of security as collateral when the banks borrow money from 
the Riksbank. Moreover, the Riksbank has in different contexts extended the list of 
eligible counterparties so that more financial agents will have the chance of easier 
management of liquidity and funding; 
3. Change is required in a number of different areas. The most recent crisis has 
demonstrated how a liquid market can very quickly dry up and become illiquid under 
certain conditions. Tougher rules are required regarding liquidity and the buffer that 
banks and credit institutions need to be able to withstand shocks. Further consideration 
is required here before we find a good solution. It is also necessary to develop further 
the analysis of asset prices and how the financial markets can be better integrated into 
our models and forecasts. This applies both with regard to the work on financial 
stability and the work on monetary policy. 
 
We have completed the review on initiatives toward the financial regulation 
reform by central bankers. So, we can focus on our original innovative propositions 
now. 
Let us say that the attempts to understand the nature of business cycles in 
finances and economics with the application of statistical models for money, wealth, 
and income distributions developed in the econophysics - a new interdisciplinary 
research field applying methods of statistical physics to problems in economics and 
finance - were made in a number of researches in Stanley (1996); Yakovenko, Rosser 
(2009). In the econophysics, the researchers used the knowledge of physics to get an 
insight on the problems frequently observed in economics in Mosekilde (1996). 
However, the econophysicists didn’t attempt to propose the remedies to stabilize the 
highly nonlinear characteristics of international financial system behaviour during 
business cycles. 
We propose the Random Tax and Quantum Tax to be considered by G20 
financial regulation and taxation experts for possible introduction in taxation regulation 
of financial institutions with the purpose to encourage banks and hedge funds to pursue 
the long term investment strategies in productive capacities. We believe that the 
Random Tax and Quantum Tax are the remedies, which will solve most of the 
problems in international financial system and change the competitive landscape in 
banking to the best. 
We propose that: 
1. The Random Tax must be imposed on the profits obtained by investment 
banks as a result of their random decisions to make the high-risk high-profit 
speculative investment transactions in equity markets, which tend to increase the 
volatility, originate the bubbles and destabilize the free market itself. 
2. The Quantum Tax has to be imposed on the profits obtained by hedge 
funds, which implement the investment strategies toward the search for first signs 
of investment bubbles creation in equity markets, and then, intentionally invest 
the big capitals in discovered investment bubbles with the aim to get huge 
speculative profits resulting in free market destabilization and possible collapse. 
The basic idea of Quantum Tax is to take the quanta of profit made by every 
hedge fund, which had hugely benefited from the investment bubbles creation and 
development in the equity or money markets, back to the state. 
 
The original proposition on the Random Tax was discussed by authors with 
Martin Wolf recently, who called it the Windfall Tax and supported the idea of the 
Random Tax / Windfall Tax introduction in Wolf (2009): 
1. All the institutions making exceptional profits do so because they are 
beneficiaries of unlimited state insurance for themselves and their counterparties; 
2. The profits being made today are in large part the fruit of the free money 
provided by the central bank, an arm of the state; 
3. The case for generous subventions is to restore the financial system – and so 
the economy – to health. It is not to enrich bankers, particularly not those engaged in 
the sorts of trading activities that destroyed the financial system in the first place; 
4. Ordinary people can accept that risk takers receive huge rewards. But such 
rewards for those who have been rescued by the state and bear substantial 
responsibility for the crisis are surely intolerable. Bankers are about to reap huge 
rewards. This damages the legitimacy of the market economy; 
5. It is hard to argue in favor of exceptional interventions to bail out the 
financial sector at times of crisis, and also against exceptional interventions to recoup 
costs when the crisis is past. “Windfall” support should be matched by windfall taxes; 
6. These are genuine windfalls. They are, as George Soros has said, “hidden 
gifts” from the state. What the state gives, the state is entitled to take back, if it is not 
used for the state’s purposes. 
 
We conclude with a remark that the global financial crisis has already changed 
the competitive landscape in banking and facilitated the introduction of meaningful 
banking regulation reform aiming the creation of evolutive competitive environment to 
maximize the effectiveness of international financial system through the adaptation of 
fair competition process among the banks in free market capitalism. Going from the 
1888 FT’s motto: “Without fear and without favour,” we came up with the innovative 
initiative to propose that the Random Tax and the Quantum Tax to be considered by the 
G20 financial regulation and taxation experts for possible introduction in taxation 
regulation of financial institutions with the purpose to encourage banks and hedge 
funds to pursue the long term investment strategies in productive capacities and 
discourage the gambling in finances. We are confident that the International Centre for 
Financial Regulation and Financial Times will evaluate the usefulness of the Random 
Tax and Quantum Tax introduction during the banking and tax regulation reforms and 
support our innovative initiative to improve the competitive landscape in banking in 
XXI century. 
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